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Recently, a stat comparison went viral:

• average viewership: 189,000/game
• average viewership: 120,000/game
• NWSL broadcast deal: $60 million/year
• MLS broadcast deal: $250 million/year

On the surface, it鈥檚 hard to argue with those numbers. If we鈥檙e comparing per-game viewership, it is clear the numbers don鈥檛 line up. NWSL average viewership per game is higher than that of the MLS, yet the MLS is making more than 4x as much as the NWSL in broadcast deals.

But this isn鈥檛 just about math. It鈥檚 about leverage, legacy and the business models we鈥檝e inherited.

To close this gap, we have to understand why it exists.

Mind the gap

When signed its $2.5 billion, 10-year deal with MLS, it wasn鈥檛 simply buying eyeballs 鈥斅爄t was strategically acquiring content IP. The deal secured global exclusivity, in-house production control, a subscription engine (MLS Season Pass), and category ownership within its platform.

By contrast, the NWSL鈥檚 $60 million per year deal 鈥斅爏plit across , , and 鈥� is monumental for a 12-year-old league. But it鈥檚 structured around traditional advertising, linear windows and shared production responsibilities. With fewer monetizable layers, the resulting deal was a lower headline number.

That $60 million per year figure includes production costs, marketing and value-in-kind contributions. Industry insiders estimate the actual cash to the league is closer to $35 million or $40 million.

Digging beyond the headline numbers reveals a key consideration: MLS has 30 teams each playing 34 regular-season matches, while the NWSL has 14 teams each playing 26. So even with the NWSL鈥檚 higher per-game viewership, the MLS produces nearly 3x the total amount of content hours.

Many buyers are still conditioned to value volume over engagement. Therein lie the conditions contributing to the conundrum.

Outdated valuation models

We need to shift our focus to the fact that the audience has moved, and the valuation models haven鈥檛.

The NWSL鈥檚 189,000 average viewership in 2024-2025 reflects explosive growth. Just a few years ago, viewership hovered under 100,000. And unlike legacy leagues, 36% of NWSL鈥檚 audience is male, proving broader crossover appeal.

Yet, buyers are still pricing women鈥檚 sports like it鈥檚 2012.

In 2007, a 13-team MLS was in its 12th year and averaged just 96,000 viewers per game, nearly half of where NWSL is today at the same point in its life cycle.

Somehow, media buyers are anchoring to MLS鈥� 2007 risk profile when assessing NWSL鈥檚 2025 opportunity. That is a blatant mistake that, unfortunately, suggests a lack of awareness of the full potential of women鈥檚 sports as an asset class. They are entirely different from the men鈥檚 model and cannot be compared to old men鈥檚 figures from a bygone era.

The -WNBA deal tells a similar story. The new NBA media deal, reportedly worth $76 billion over 11 years, allocates just $2.2 billion to the WNBA. That鈥檚 less than 3%, despite WNBA viewership surging 96% year over year on ESPN and triple digits on .

Again, this isn鈥檛 about performance. It鈥檚 about who had leverage, how risk was priced, and what decision-makers were conditioned to value.

It鈥檚 a misconception that the rise of women鈥檚 leagues threatens legacy properties. In actuality, they expand the total addressable audience. There鈥檚 no need to treat them as a zero-sum game; Caitlin Clark鈥檚 arrival didn鈥檛 stop the 2025 Super Bowl from setting a new U.S. TV record with 127.7 million viewers.

The real risk is underpricing growth just because it doesn鈥檛 fit the old template. So, where does that leave us?

Missed opportunities

If we keep pricing based on history instead of momentum, we鈥檒l continue to miss the biggest upside of this era. The market is failing to recognize what鈥檚 actually happening on the ground, from viewership to fan engagement, and continuing to look for easy comps against old metrics that aren鈥檛 truly comparable.

As an investor and operator, I鈥檝e seen what happens when you bet on markets others deem 鈥渘iche.鈥� Years ago, women鈥檚 health companies like ,, and began as 鈥渆dge case鈥� investments and are now redefining categories. The need was always there. The system just hadn鈥檛 caught up.

Women鈥檚 sports are following the same arc. The difference is that this time, the world is watching and demanding more. We just have to catch the attention of those making these deals to ensure they hear our demands or forge ahead with breaking into those spaces and making our own decisions.

This moment where many are realizing the math isn鈥檛 adding up is a signal to those bold enough to build and brave enough to change how we define value to seize the biggest opportunity in sports today. Don鈥檛 miss it.

is the co-founder and managing partner of and Muse Sport, as well as the chair of the and owner of SailGP Italia. Muse Capital is a consumer technology fund investing in companies that should exist, especially those transforming how we care, live and play. Muse Sport is an advisory business that provides strategic capital, operational support and commercial partnerships to emerging sports properties and infrastructure opportunities. A recognized force in sports, women鈥檚 healthcare and tech-enabled consumer innovation, Grazioli-Venier鈥檚 investment philosophy bridges purpose and performance, focusing on underserved markets with global scale potential.

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